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RECENT  high levels  of interest rates have had many effects on the 
economy. One  particularly  dramatic  phenomenon  associated  with  these 
high interest  rates is an extraordinarily  high  bankruptcy  rate. A related 
observation  is that  during  the 1970s  both  corporate  debt-value  ratios  and 
nominal  interest  rates  were nearly  double  their  previous  postwar  values.' 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the possible economic links 
between interest rates, inflation, corporate financial  policy, and the 
corporate  bankruptcy  rate in order to explain the above associations. 
The  primary  focus is on the  role  of interest  rates  and  inflation  in  theoretical 
models of corporate  financial  policy. The paper  provides  an analysis  of 
how changes in interest rates or inflation  can lead to both higher  debt- 
value  ratios  and  a higher  bankruptcy  rate;  it  also  gives empirical  estimates 
of the relative importance  of expected interest rates and inflation  and 
unexpected  changes  in interest  rates  and  inflation  in explaining  the level 
and  composition  of corporate  debt. 
I thank  members  of the Brookings  Panel  for  comments.  I also thank  Nancy  Ng for  ably 
performing  the computations  and Susan Pope for assistance in the early stages of the 
project.  The views expressed  in this paper  are those of the author,  and  do not necessarily 
represent  those of Bell Laboratories  or of the Bell System. 
1. For example, according  to the figures  in Gordon  and Malkiel,  between 1965  and 
1975  the ratio  of the market  value  of debt  to the market  value  of the firms  grew  from  0.159 
to 0.316  for  the nonfinancial  corporations  on the Compustat  tape.  During  that  same  period, 
the average  yearly  new issue AA corporate  utilities  interest  rate  grew from  4.57 to 9.50. 
See Roger  H. Gordon  and  Burton  G. Malkiel,  "Corporation  Finance,"  in Henry  J. Aaron 
and Joseph A. Pechman, eds.,  How Taxes Affect Economic Behavior (Brookings Institu- 
tion, 1981),  table 1, p. 158. 
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Theoretical Models of Corporate Financial Policy 
In the past, theoretical  models of corporate  financial  policy have not 
focused  on the  effects of interest  rates  on financial  decisions.  Yet nominal 
interest  rates  play an important  role  in these models  because  it is nominal 
interest  payments that appear  in the tax law. However, the commonly 
cited models differ  in their  forecasts regarding  the direction  of effect of 
interest rates on debt-value ratios. The examination below of  the 
empirical  relation  between interest  rates and corporate  financial  policy 
provides a simple test of the relative importance  of the effects isolated 
in the various  models. 
The modern  literature  on corporate  financial  policy really  begins  with 
articles  by Modigliani  and Miller.2  In their  latest article, they argue  that 
the U.S.  corporate tax structure  should lead firms to use solely debt 
finance, regardless of interest rates. Since that time, several theories 
have been proposed  to reconcile this forecast  with the observed  limited 
use of debt finance by U.S.  corporations.  The most commonly cited 
theory argues  that the tax advantage  to using debt is in equilibrium  just 
offset at the margin  by the additional  agency costs and possible bank- 
ruptcy  costs incurred  as a result of the extra debt.3  Most of this section 
explores the role of interest  rates in this model. 
Two alternative  theories  argue  that  there  really  is no tax advantage  to 
debt finance  in equilibrium.  The first  argues  that  as extra  debt is added, 
the corporate  tax advantage  to using debt finance decreases since the 
probability  of being  unable  to make  use of interest  deductions  increases  .4 
2.  See Franco Modigliani  and Merton  H. Miller, "The Cost of Capital,  Corporation 
Finance,  and  the Theory  of Investment,  " American  Economic  Review,  vol.48 (June  1958), 
pp. 261-97; Merton  H. Miller  and Franco  Modigliani,  "Dividend  Policy, Growth  and  the 
Valuation  of Shares,"  Journal  of Business,  vol. 34  (October  1961),  pp. 411-33;  and  Franco 
Modigliani  and Merton  H. Miller, "Corporate  Income  Taxes and the Cost of Capital:  A 
Correction,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 53 (June  1963),  pp. 433-43. 
3. For recent developments  of this argument,  see James  H. Scott, Jr., "A Theory  of 
Optimal  Capital  Structure,"  Bell Journal  of Economics, vol. 7 (Spring  1976),  pp. 33-54; 
Gordon and Malkiel, "Corporation  Finance"; Amir Barnea, Robert A. Haugen, and 
Lemma W. Senbet, "An Equilibrium  Analysis of Debt Financing  under Costly Tax 
Arbitrage  and Agency Problems,"  Journal  of Finance, vol. 36 (June 1981),  pp. 569-81; 
and Franco Modigliani,  Presidential  Address, "Debt, Dividend  Policy, Taxes, Inflation 
and Market Valuation,"  Journal of Finance,  vol. 37 (May 1982, Papers and Proceedings, 
1981), pp. 255-73. 
4.  See, for example, Harry DeAngelo and Ronald W. Masulis, "Optimal  Capital 
Structure  under  Corporate  and  Personal  Taxation,"  Journal  of Financial  Economics,  vol. 
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In equilibrium  the tax advantage  falls to the point  at which  it is  just offset 
by the unchanging  personal tax disadvantage to debt (arising  from a 
higher  personal  tax rate on interest  payments  than  on a combination  of 
dividends  and capital  gains). The second theory  argues  that, as persons 
in  higher  personal  tax brackets  must  be induced  to buy  debt, the  personal 
tax disadvantage  to using debt in equilibrium  becomes great enough  to 
offset the unchanging  corporate tax advantage to debt.' The role of 
interest rates in these two alternative  models is discussed later in this 
section. 
CORPORATE  TAX  ADVANTAGE  VERSUS  BANKRUPTCY  COSTS 
The basic intuition  in this model is simple. As a firm  makes  use of the 
net tax advantage  to debt by borrowing  to replace equity, the risk of 
bankruptcy  rises. This higher risk implies a higher  probability  of real 
losses occurring  during  bankruptcy,  higher  monitoring  and negotiating 
costs with potential lenders now, and a variety of agency costs, as 
managers  attempt  to aid equity holders  at the expense of debt holders.6 
It is argued  that in equilibrium  these costs become important  enough  at 
the margin  to offset the unchanging  tax advantage  to debt. 
The weakness of this approach is that researchers, attempting  to 
quantify  costs of bankruptcy,  have not found  cost comparable  in size to 
the presumed  tax advantages  of debt. Warner,  for example, found that 
legal and administrative  costs incurred  in bankruptcy  tend to be only 
about  5 percent  of the outstanding  liabilities  of the bankrupt  firm.7  While 
the various  types of agency costs could in principle  be as large  as the tax 
advantage  to debt, there are no empirical  measures to confirm  this.8 
Acceptance  of the model  must  ultimately  rest then  on the accuracy  of its 
implications,  one of the more  interesting  being  the  relation  that  is forecast 
between interest  rates and corporate  financial  policy. 
5.  See Merton  H. Miller,  Presidential  Address,  "Debt  and  Taxes,"  Journal ofFinance, 
vol. 32 (May 1977,  Papers and Proceedings,  1976), pp. 261-75. 
6. For  further  discussion  see Stewart  C. Myers,  "Determinants  of Corporate  Borrow- 
ing," Journal of Financial  Economics,  vol. 5 (November  1977),  pp. 147-75;  and  Michael 
C. Jensen  and  William  H. Meckling,  "Theory  of the Firm:  Managerial  Behavior,  Agency 
Costs  and  Ownership  Structure," Journal of Financial Economics,  vol. 3 (October  1976), 
pp. 305-60. 
7.  See Jerold  B. Warner,  "Bankruptcy,  Absolute Priority,  and the Pricing  of Risky 
Debt  Claims,"  Journal of Financial Economics,  vol. 4 (May 1977),  pp. 239-76. 
8. See Michelle  J. White,  "Bankruptcy  Costs:  Theory  and  Evidence,"  Working  Paper 
287  (New York  University,  Salomon  Brothers  Center,  1981). 464  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1982 
In developing  this explicitly, I begin by making  the following  simpli- 
fying assumptions: 
There  is only one form  of debt and  one form  of equity, each of which 
can be bought  and sold freely in the market.  New debt is issued at par. 
Debt and equity holders, when pricing  their securities, demand  the 
same after-tax,  risk-free  return  and the same risk premium  per "unit" 
of risk. 
Tax factors are exogenous. 
In the absence of taxes and  bankruptcy-related  costs, the Modigliani- 
Miller  theorem  is satisfied, implying  that the firm  is indifferent  between 
debt and equity finance. 
The argument  is developed as follows. First the coupon rate and the 
market price of equity are derived at which investors are willing to 
purchase any given amount of debt and equity issued by the firm. In 
equilibrium  the expected after-tax  return  on a security  must  provide  the 
required  after-tax,  risk-free  return  on the funds  invested, plus a suitable 
risk  premium.  Given  the market  valuation  of debt  versus  equity, the firm 
then chooses to issue the quantity  of debt that maximizes  the value of 
the outstanding  equity  per share. 
If the firm  borrows  D dollars,  lenders  by competition  charge  a nominal 
coupon  rate, r, which  gives them  a pattern  of returns  as attractive  as that 
they can obtain  elsewhere. For any  given r, the expected  after-tax  return 
to bondholders  is composed of several components.  First, bondholders 
receive rD in coupon payments,  on which they pay tax at rate  m.9  If the 
term  structure  of interest  rates is not flat, they also expect a capital  gain 
or loss, gD, in the market  value of their bonds. In addition,  there is a 
further  expected capital  loss, (b + c)D, due to the chance that the firm 
goes bankrupt  and does not fully repay the money owed to the bond- 
holders. (The distinction between b and c is explained below.) If the 
effective capital gains tax rate is tg, the expected after-tax  income to 
bondholders is [(1 -  tg)(g -  b -  c) +  (1 -  m)r]D. For higher values of 
D, one would expect b and c, as well as r, to be larger. 
By competition, r will be set so that this expected return  equals the 
9. In the context of Brennan  and Gordon-Bradford,  m would represent  a weighted 
average  of investor  tax rates  on interest  income, where  the wealthier  and  less risk  averse 
get more  weight. See M. J. Brennan,  "Taxes, Market  Valuation  and  Corporate  Financial 
Policy,  " National Tax  Journal,  vol. 23  (December  1970),  pp.  417-27;  and  Roger  H. Gordon 
and David  F. Bradford,  "Taxation  and the Stock Market  Valuation  of Capital  Gains  and 
Dividends,"  Journal  of Public  Economics,  vol. 14  (October  1980),  pp. 109-36. Roger H. Gordon  465 
after-tax,  risk-free  return,  (1 -  m)iD, where i is the coupon rate on a 
risk-free  bond, plus an appropriate  risk premium, JDD.  Therefore, in 
equilibrium10 
(1)  [(1 -  tg)(g-b  -  c) + (1 -m)r]D  = [(1 - m)i  +  8D]D. 
Expected income to equity holders from the firm equals expected 
profits,  X, after corporate taxes at rate T,  plus any expected nominal 
capital  gains due to inflation  or to the approach  of future  profits,  GQ,  less 
the expected payments to bondholders. The coupon payments, rD, 
reduce  after  corporate  tax income by (1 -  T)rD.  In addition,  in general, 
capital  gains  to bondholders  during  the  period  generate  equivalent  capital 
losses to equity holders. However, to the extent that  there  are  real  costs 
incurred  in bankruptcy  or inefficient  decisions made due to the risk of 
bankruptcy,  there could be some capital  losses to bondholders  that do 
not result  in capital  gains to equity  holders.  These are denoted  by c. I  I  In 
contrast,  b represents  the expected losses to bondholders  in bankruptcy 
that  are  just transfers  to equity  holders. If the effective personal  tax rate 
on equity income is denoted by e,'2 the expected after-tax  return  to 
equity holders  is 
(1  -  e)[Gx  +  (1  -  )X-  (1  -  )rD  -  (g  -  b)D]. 
10. If the expected size of bankruptcy  losses (b + c) is sufficiently  sensitive  to the size 
of the coupon payments  that  the firm  makes, rD, there  may be no r satisfying  equation  I 
for sufficiently  high values of D. For further  discussion see E. Han Kim, "A Mean- 
Variance  Theory  of Optimal  Capital  Structure  and  Corporate  Debt  Capacity,"  Journal  of 
Finance, vol. 33 (March  1978),  pp. 45-64. 
11. The c includes  a component  reflecting  the cost of bearing  the extra  risk  from  these 
uncertain  costs. Also, by construction,  c rather  than  X captures  the losses from  inefficient 
investment  decisions. 
12. There  are many unresolved  issues about  the personal  taxation  of equity income 
that  make  the appropriate  treatment  unclear.  Both  dividends  and  capital  gains  are subject 
to personal  income tax under  the law, with dividends  taxed at a much  higher  rate. If the 
firm  were to use the funds paid out as dividends  to repurchase  shares on the market, 
however, shareholders  would receive the same income taxed at the lower capital  gains 
rate.  The heavier  tax on dividends  appears  to be a voluntary  tax, and  it is unclear  why it is 
paid.  The effective tax rate  on capital  gains  is also unclear.  The tax is paid  only when the 
capital  gains are realized.  The shareholder  chooses when  to realize  the gains  and  has the 
incentive to realize losses early (perhaps  short term) and postpone realizing  gains. (If 
realization  is postponed  until  death,  no tax is due.) Indeed,  Stiglitz  hypothesizes  that,  as a 
result of realizing losses short-term  and gains long-term,  expected capital gains tax 
payments  may even be negative. See Joseph  E. Stiglitz, "Some Aspects of the Taxation 
of Capital Gains," Journal of Public Economics,  forthcoming. 466  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1982 
At the equilibrium  market value of the outstanding  equity E, this 
expected  after-tax  income  will  bejust sufficient  to provide  equity  holders 
with the after-tax, risk-free return, (1 -  m)iE, that they could have 
obtained  elsewhere, plus a suitable  risk  premium,  bEE. Therefore  E must 
satisfy 
(2)  (1 -e)[G  + (1 -T)X-(1  -T)rD-(g-b)D] 
=  [(1 -  m)i  +  E]E. 
Adding  equations 1 and  2, one obtains 
(3)  (1  -  e)[Gx  +  (1  -  T)X] +  [T +  e(I  -  T)-m]rD  -  (1 -tg)cD 
+  (e -  tg)(g -  b)D =  (1 -m)i(D  + E) +  (bLD +  bEE). 
The left-hand  side of equation  3 measures  the expected income  for both 
bond and equity holders. The second term on the left captures the 
advantage  to using debt due to the tax treatment  of coupon  payments- 
the combined  corporate  and  personal  tax savings  of equity  holders  when 
interest  payments  rD are made, [v +  e(I  -  T)]rD, while the extra  taxes 
paid  by bondholders  are only mrD.  13 
The third  term  represents  the offsetting  real  bankruptcy-related  costs 
associated  with the use of debt, while the fourth  captures  any difference 
between debt and equity holders in the tax treatment of expected 
transfers  from  one group  to the other. The right-hand  side measures  the 
expected return  required  by bond  and  equity  holders  together.  Since, by 
assumption,  debt and equity holders charge  the same price per "unit" 
of risk that they bear, the total risk premium,  (8DD +  bEE),  will not 
depend  on how much  debt versus equity is used in financing  the firm. 
What will characterize  the optimal  debt-value  decision of the firm? 
The cost of adjusting  financial  policy is considered in a later section. 
13.  The presumption that [i-  +  e(1 -  r)] > m refers to large corporations only. Implicit 
estimates  of m, made by comparing  tax exempt with taxable  interest  rates as in Gordon 
and  Malkiel,  "Corporation  Finance,  " or  by comparing  yields  on  discount  bonds  and  newer 
issue bonds  as in McCulloch,  range  around  0.25 to 0.30, compared  with  a value  of X of 0.48 
(0.46  recently).  For  small  firms,  the  marginal  corporate  rate  could  be much  lower,  however, 
in which case the theory would imply a tax disadvantage  to debt. Since Shiller and 
Modigliani,  using  different  techniques,  estimate  higher  values  of m, the presumption  that 
X >  m is not beyond question. See J. Huston McCulloch, "The Tax-Adjusted  Yield 
Curve," Journal  of Finance, vol. 30 (June 1975),  pp. 811-30;  and Robert  J. Shiller  and 
Franco  Modigliani,  "Coupon  and  Tax Effects  on New and  Seasoned  Bond  Yields  and  the 
Measurement  of the Cost of Debt Capital," Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 7 
(September  1979),  pp. 297-318. Roger H. Gordon  467 
Ignoring  such costs for now, if the firm  increases  D by one dollar,  it can 
use the dollar to repurchase  a dollar's worth of equity. If the market 
value of the remaining  equity declines by less than a dollar, equity 
holders  will prefer  the extra  debt. At the optimal  value  for  D, an increase 
in D of a dollar  will result in exactly a dollar  reduction  in E. Therefore, 
by differentiating  equation  3 with respect to D and setting  aE/aD  -  1, 
one can characterize  the optimal  use of debt:  14 
(4)  (vT+  e(l  -  T) -  m)[r  +  arD] 
+ (e -  tg)(  -  =D  (1I  tg)  A 
Therefore, when it is optimal for the firm to use any debt at all, the 
increase in tax savings from more debt is just offset by an increase in 
real bankruptcy-related  costs. 
As is clear from equation  4, nominal  interest  rates as well as relative 
tax rates play a key role in determining  the optimal amount of debt 
finance.  For example, assume that the interest  rate  a firm  faces depends 
linearly  on the firm's  debt-value  ratio, so that  r = i + a(DIV),  where Vis 
the value of the firm.  15  Also assume that  total  bankruptcy  costs, cD, can 
be approximated  by cD  cOV(DIV)2,  so that, given DlV, bankruptcy 
costs are proportional  to the scale of the firm.  16 If, for simplicity,  e = tg 
so that any difference in tax treatment of transfers can be ignored, 
equation  4 simplifies  to 
(5)  .  +  e(l  -  T)  -  m  D 
where  (1  2Co  -  a[T+  e(I  -  T)  -  m]}  V 
where c*O-(  -  Ogco. 
14. I assume  that  all the firm's  debt  has equal  priority,  so that  the interest  rate  on all  of 
the firm's  debt rises to reflect the extra risk of bankruptcy  when more debt is issued. I 
ignore  the fact that  it may  be too late  for  existing  bondholders  to raise  the interest  rate  they 
charge  when  new debt  is issued. 
15. Although  use of the market  value  of the firm  as a scaling  factor  is customary  here, 
other  measures  (for  example,  liquidating  value)  might  be proposed. 
16. Since c is itself a function  of D, the expression  cD can depend  in an arbitrary  way 
on D. Here I assume,  as in Gordon  and  Malkiel,  "Corporation  Finance,"  that  bankruptcy 
costs are zero when debt is zero and that marginal  bankruptcy  costs, 8(cD)/8D, increase 
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Assume  further that co -  aLT +  e(1  -  T)  -  m] >  0, which ensures 
that  the firm  is not all debt-financed.  Then, given the tax rates, the debt- 
value ratio is proportional  to nominal  interest  rates and is an increasing 
function  of the tax advantage  term, [v +  e(1  +  T)  -  m]. 
The linearity  assumptions  are arbitrary.  In general,  though,  the debt- 
value ratio still depends  positively, but not linearly,  on nominal  interest 
rates. Since tax rates  have not varied  much  over time, this model  implies 
that nominal  interest rates ought to have been a prime  determinant  of 
the debt-value  ratio. 
While there are many ways in which this model can be made more 
complicated, relaxing the initial assumptions has little effect on the 
important  role of nominal  interest  rates in determining  the equilibrium 
debt-value  ratio. For example, it is frequently  assumed that debt and 
equity  holders  have different  required  after-tax,  risk-free  rates  of return 
or different  risk premiums  per "unit" risk.'7  To be concrete, assume 
that risk-free  returns  differ  due to tax differences  alone, with mD  as the 
personal  tax rate of debt holders  and  mE  (with  mE >  MD) as the personal 
tax rate of equity holders, and that 8  JDD + bEE is an increasing  and 
convex function  of D. With  these two changes, the first-order  condition 
for D becomes 
ar 
(4a)  [+  e(1  -T)  -mE]i  +  [T+  e(1-T)-mD](r  +  -DD-i) 
aD 
+ (e -  tg)  bD  (l  tg)  +D  dD 
/D  aD  aD 
Again,  the debt-value  ratio  is positively  related  to nominal  interest  rates, 
but  now the weight  on the risk-free  component  is less than  the weight  on 
the marginal  risk premium  in interest  rates. Also, the tax advantage  to 
extra debt is now offset partly  by extra bankruptcy  costs and partly  by 
increased  risk-bearing  costs. 
Another frequently questioned assumption  is that "me-first"  rules 
are satisfied.'8 If me-first rules do not hold, existing bondholders, 
17. See, for example, Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Some Aspects of the Pure Theory of 
Corporate  Finance:  Bankruptcies  and Take-Overs,"  Bell Journal  of Economics, vol. 3 
(Autumn  1972),  pp. 458-82. 
18. For example,  as discussed  in White,  new loans  can be secured  by physical  assets, 
in which case they implicitly  have priority  over older unsecured  loans. See Michelle  J. 
White,  "Economics  of Bankruptcy,"  Working  Paper  286  (New York  University,  Salomon 
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participants  in pension plans, or some other third  party may be made 
worse off when the firm  issues extra  debt. If equity  holders  and  the new 
lender  together  can gain  at the expense of third  parties  when new debt  is 
issued, the incentive  to add  extra  debt  is increased.  For  example,  assume 
arbitiarily  that the new lender bears only the fraction, cx,  of any extra 
bankruptcy-related  losses,  (  d  c,  incurred  as a result of the extra 
aD 
debt. Then the first-order  condition for the optimal debt-value ratio, 
assuming  that assumption  2 again  holds, is 
(4b)  [T  +  e(l  -T)  -m]  (r  + dD)  + (e  -tg)  (g  d  L(D  ) 
a(bD)  w(D) 
+  (I  1-e)(  l-  a)  (d  =o(  l  -  tg)(d)  aD  a 
Of course previous  lenders, given rational  expectations, should  have 
foreseen the possibility of these future  issues. To the extent that bond 
covenants would not be adequate to prevent the extra issues, these 
previous lenders would have charged a higher coupon rate, but this 
existing higher coupon does not change the current incentive to add 
extra  debt. 
In this setting nominal interest rates still matter as before. Other 
factors may become more important,  however. Presumably,  for exam- 
ple, the standard  set of bond covenants has grown more sophisticated 
over time, increasing  the degree  to which me-first  rules  hold. 
The above model assumes that debt and equity holders price their 
securities  as economic theory  suggests. This assumption  also is increas- 
ingly being questioned. For example, Modigliani  and Cohn  suggest  that 
equity  holders  do not recognize  that  inflation  increases  the nominal  value 
of the firm's capital stock.19  Specifically, they argue that the market 
ought to price equity based on equation  2, reexpressed  with  real  returns 
on each side, whereby 
(2a)  (I -  e)[GS-,  +  (I  -  T)X  -  (I  -  T)rD  +  7rD -  (g  -  b)D] 
=  [(1 -  m)i -  w +  8E]E. 
Here wT  is the inflation  rate and G: is the expected real capital gains. 
19.  See Franco Modigliani and Richard A. Cohn,  "Inflation, Rational Valuation and 
the Market," Financial Analysts Journal, vol. 35 (March-April  1979), pp. 24-44. 470  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1982 
However, they assert instead  that  the market  prices equity  based  on 
(2b)  (1 -e)[G  + (1 -T)X-(1-T)rD-(g-b)D] 
=  [(1 -  m)i  +  ME]E. 
If debt is still priced  according  to equation  1, managers,  to maximize  the 
market  value of equity, will act just as described by equation  4. The 
previous results carry through  without change. But the deviation be- 
tween the true economic value and the observed market  value of the 
firm  may make it inappropriate  to measure  V in equation  5 by the firm's 
market  value.20 
More generally, the previous results carry  through  for any arbitrary 
expectations by the market  for Gx  and  X, as long as managers  continue 
to maximize  equity  value  per  share.  However,  if managers  have  different, 
and presumably  better informed,  expectations about G, or X than the 
market,  they may choose to aid  future  shareholders  by trading  in equity 
to take advantage  of their superior  information.  In particular,  if they 
believe that equity is underpriced, they will borrow to repurchase 
equity-the  arbitrage  profits add to the incentive to increase debt. 
However, the firm  must publicly announce  its trading,  so that rational 
investors in principle  ought to infer  from  the firm's  trading  practice  the 
nature  of the firm's  information-the more  optimistic  the managers,  the 
more  heavily they shift toward  debt. The price ought  then to reflect  the 
information  that the market  learns, weakening  the importance  of this 
arbitrage  by managers.21 
Generalizing  the previous results to handle more than two types of 
securities is also straightforward.  Assume, for example, that there are 
debt issues with many  different  maturity  dates. Let Dj be the amount  of 
debt maturing  inj months  that  is issued by the firm,  with  D now denoting 
the total amount  of debt. Let rj  equal the coupon rate paid on debt Dj. 
20. For example,  assume  that  5 is valid  using  the correct  valuation  for equity  implied 
by 2, but that  the observed  valuation  for equity  implied  by 2b is used when  calculating  the 
debt-value  ratio. Then simple algebra  implies that the observed  debt-value  ratio, DlV, 
exceeds the true  debt-value  ratio  by the  amount  (D/V)(1  -  e)-rr/[(1  -  m) i +  8jE]. Therefore, 
if this  error  in valuation  has occurred,  the observed  debt-value  ratio  ought  to have  a strong 
positive  relation  with  the inflation  rate,  even controlling  for nominal  interest  rates. 
21. As in Grossman  and Stiglitz, some noise in the manager's  trading  rule would be 
necessary  to achieve equilibrium.  See Sanford  J. Grossman  and  Joseph  E. Stiglitz, "On 
the  Impossibility  of Informationally  Efficient  Markets,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 
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For simplification, let e =  tg. Then, by generalization of the argument in 
the previous  section, equation  3 can be rewritten  as 
(3a)  (1-  e)[G,  +  (1-  T)X] +  ErDj  [T+  e(1 -  T)  -  m] 
-  (1 -  tg)cD =  (1 -  m)i(D +  E) +  (8LD +  bEE), 
where  cD, the size of the total  bankruptcy-related  costs, depends  on the 
size of each Dj, and  ADD  is the total risk  premium  on all the debt. 
Differentiating  with respect to the amount of debt at a particular 
maturity, D,  and setting aE/aDs =  -  1, gives 
(4c)  [+  (1  -)  -]  + ED  arj  1  (1  tg)  a(cD)  (4c)  L7e~~7Jm]LrsZ.~iaDJ  (ltg) 
As before, the left-hand  side measures the tax savings that arise from 
increasing  Ds by a dollar,  and  the right-hand  side measures  the resulting 
increase  in bankruptcy-related  costs. 
Equation 4c shows that the optimal Ds depends critically on the 
prevailing nominal interest rate,  rs, for  that particular maturity. 
To illustrate, assume that rs  is + E  where is is the interest 
rate  on  default-free debt  of  that  maturity.22  Also  assume  that 
cD = coV (  I) Li  + 3  (D) ]. Here the previous  quadratic  term  is 
multiplied  by an expression  capturing  the idea  that  concentrating  a given 
amount  of debt  in a particular  maturity  may  be increasingly  risky  because 
it all comes due at once. With  these assumptions,  4c simplifies  to 
(5a)  DsV  dCo  [T  e(1  T)  -M]  is  +  as 
DjS(  V  2co-v  [+  -  J(  vJ 
D  /DjV  -  2c  -  +  LrT+ e(I  -7T)-  m]3ajs -I 
V  I  ky/ 
22. In general,  the risk-free  coupon  rate, i,  can vary  by maturity.  However, when it 
does, expected  capital  gains, g5, must  vary in an offsetting  way so that  the total  after-tax 
return,  g,  +  (1  -  m)i,, is the same for all maturities.  The i on the right-hand  side of 3a 
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The set of equations  in 5a, one for each maturity  length s, implies for 
example that the relative use of short-term  versus long-term  finance 
depends positively on the level of short-term  versus long-term  interest 
rates. This is true even though the expectations theory of the term 
structure  makes  the present  discounted  value  of interest  payments  equal 
for all financing  strategies. The reason is that there is an advantage  to 
taking high interest deductions sooner rather  than later. The relation 
between short-term  interest  rates  and  short-term  financing  is not simple, 
however. 
Thus far I have avoided relaxing  the assumption  that tax rates are 
exogenous in order  to sharply  differentiate  the model of tax advantage 
versus bankruptcy  costs from  the DeAngelo-Masulis  model, in which T 
is endogenous, and  the Miller  model, in which m is endogenous.  In both 
alternative  models, bankruptcy  costs are  normally  assumed  not to exist. 
ENDOGENOUS  CORPORATE  TAX  RATE 
The corporate  tax rate  may be endogenous  because of the progressiv- 
ity of the corporate  tax law, and, in particular,  because of the lack of 
refundability  when  the  firm  has  tax losses. Carry-back  and  carry-forward 
provisions in the tax law, transfer of tax deductions through  leasing 
(which  was made  much  easier  in the 1981  Economic  Recovery  Act), and 
mergers  of firms  to make  use of tax losses serve to equalize  marginal  tax 
rates over time and among  firms.23  To the extent that tax rates are not 
fully equalized, however, the firm's expected marginal  corporate  tax 
rate may change as its financial policy changes. That is, with extra 
interest  deductions,  the firm  is more  likely to be in a lower tax bracket. 
If one allows T to be endogenous in the above derivation,  the first- 
order  condition  for D becomes24 
23. As an indication  of the limited importance  of the lack of refundability  in the 
corporate  tax law, for the firms  on the Compustat  tape, aggregate  tax loss carried  forward 
averaged  5.6 percent  of aggregate  corporate  tax payments.  Of the aggregate  tax losses 
carried  forward  into the next tax year, on average  26.2 percent  were used up  reducing  tax 
payments  in that  year. For  figures  from  a broader  cross-section  of firms  suggesting  greater 
importance  of the lack of refundability,  see Joseph J. Cordes  and Steven M. Sheffrin, 
"Taxation  and  the Sectoral  Allocation  of Capital  in the U.S.," National  Tax Journal, vol. 
34 (December  1981),  pp. 419-32. 
24. When the marginal  corporate tax rate is endogenous and corporate taxable 
income is  stochastic, expected corporate tax payments in 3 can be expressed as 
xLX-rD 
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(4d)  [  + e(I  -)-m]  r +  a-D 
+ (e -  tg)  0  )  1  9) 
The only change is that T  is replaced  by the expected marginal  tax rate, 
v. Again, nominal  interest  rates  play an important  role. 
If the movement in T  is the primary  process leading  to equilibrium, 
however, the relation  between  nominal  interest  rates  and  the equilibrium 
amount of debt is more complicated. Assume for simplicity, as do 
DeAngelo  and Masulis,  that c  =  0 and that e  =  tg =  0. Then equation 
4d implies that in equilibrium  v  =  m, regardless  of the level of nominal 
interest rates. However, v itself depends in part  on the size of nominal 
rates. If nominal interest rates increase, interest deductions increase 
(immediately on short-term  debt and gradually  for long-term debt). 
Everything  else being equal, the amount  of debt would  have to drop  for 
interest  deductions  and  v to remain  unchanged. 
If the rise in nominal  rates  were accompanied  by a rise in the inflation 
rate, inflation  would  cause the real  value of depreciation  deductions  and 
inventory deductions to fall (for firms  using the FIFO, or first in, first 
out method). The drop  in the value of these deductions  would imply  by 
itself an increase in the incentive to use debt. Viewed as a function of 
both r and wT,  however, D ought  to increase  as T increases, given r, and 
fall as r increases, given a. This conclusion contrasts  sharply  with that 
from  the model of the tax advantage  versus bankruptcy  costs, in which 
D increases as r increases, and T plays a small  role. Of course, the two 
theories  are not mutually  exclusive. 
ENDOGENOUS  PERSONAL  TAX  RATE 
Thus far it has been assumed  that the individual  tax rates, e, m, and 
tg,  are exogenous to changes in a firm's  financial  structure.  The ration- 
alization  for this treatment  can be found in Brennan  and in Gordon  and 
andf(X) is the density  function  of X. Differentiating  with  respect  to D gives -  LT  T(X - 
rD)f(X)dX  (d)--  T(aD),  where is the  expected  marginal  taxrate.  With  this  change, 
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Bradford.25  These papers  show that  when tax rates vary among  individ- 
uals and when those individuals can buy and sell all assets without 
constraints, the effective tax rates characterizing  market equilibrium 
prices are simply weighted averages of the corresponding  tax rates of 
each individual  investor, where each weight depends on the investor's 
wealth and his degree of risk aversion. If each individual's  tax rate is 
exogenous to a firm'  s behavior,  the weighted  average  will effectively be 
exogenous also. 
This conclusion is not robust, however. For example, when individ- 
uals face constraints in their portfolio behavior, such as borrowing 
constraints  and short sales constraints, as discussed in Auerbach  and 
King, the tax rates characterizing  market  equilibrium  can well vary as 
firms  change their financial  policy.26  The implicit  market  tax rates now 
depend  on the degree to which these various  constraints  are binding,  as 
well as on the weighted  average  of individual  tax rates. 
If one allows personal tax rates to be endogenous in the above 
derivation  for the optimal  use of debt by a firm,  the first-order  condition 
for a firm  shown in equation  4 would not change  in form, assuming  that 
each firm is small enough to act as a price taker with respect to the 
market-wide  implicit  prices, m, e, and tg. Even if each firm  treats these 
prices as given, however, they will gradually  adjust as firms together 
change their policies. In particular,  as more debt is issued, investors in 
higher  tax brackets  must  be induced  to buy some  of it, raising  the market- 
wide tax rate, m. In the simplified setting of Miller in which c  =  e  =  tg 
= 0, equilibrium  is reached  when m rises to the point  that  m  =  T.  Since 
each firm  takes m and T as given, however, each firm  is indifferent  to 
how much debt it issues. The aggregate  amount  of debt must be large 
enough, however, to drive m to the value  7. 
If the endogeneity  of m is the sole process leading  to an equilibrium, 
how should the aggregate  amount of debt respond to a change in the 
level of market interest rates? Several types of indirect effects could 
occur. First, a rise in market interest rates raises the size of capital 
income, driving  investors into higher  tax brackets.  The resulting  rise in 
25. See Brennan,  "Taxes, Market  Valuation  and Corporate  Financial  Policy," and 
Gordon  and  Bradford,  "Taxation  and  the Stock Market  Valuation." 
26. See Alan  J. Auerbach  and  Mervyn  A. King,  "Taxation,  Portfolio  Choice  and  Debt- 
Equity  Ratios: A General  Equilibrium  Model," Quarterly  Journal  of Economics,  forth- 
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m, everything  else being equal, causes the equilibrium  amount  of debt 
to fall. Similarly,  a rise in interest  rates that is accompanied  by inflation 
drives  investors into higher  tax brackets,  again  lowering  the equilibrium 
amount  of debt. In  addition,  however,  arise in  rates  raises  the  importance 
to investors of differences in the tax treatment  of debt versus equity 
relative to risk considerations. This causes further specialization in 
portfolios, everything  else being equal, concentrating  the existing debt 
in the hands  of those with lower tax rates, and  thereby  lowering  m. The 
equilibrium  amount  of debt increases  as a result. 
In general, the theoretical  relation  between interest  rates and aggre- 
gate debt described above would be compounded  by these additional 
factors. 
ENDOGENEITY  OF  THE  FUNCTION  c(DIV) 
The bankruptcy  cost function  has been assumed  to be exogenous up 
to this point. In this section I briefly  note a number  of reasons why c 
might  vary among  firms  and  over time. 
Clearly  when the future  value of the firm  is more  uncertain  the risk  of 
default and the size of agency costs both grow more quickly as the 
amount  of debt  outstanding  increases. One  would  therefore  expect debt- 
value  ratios  to be lower  both  for  individual  firms  whose value  is relatively 
more volatile and in aggregate  at dates when the value of firms  tends to 
be more volatile. 
The function  c also shifts  when the bankruptcy  law (statutory  or case 
law) changes, as it did, for example, in 1979. Similarly, increasing 
sophistication over time in designing the various covenants in bond 
contracts  should  lead to a gradual  decline  in agency  costs, and  an  upward 
drift  in debt levels. 
Inflation  may also have an effect on bankruptcy  costs. For a firm  to 
be forced into bankruptcy,  not only must there be no source of new 
outside finance, but also the firm  must default  on its existing claims. It 
can continue as long as its current cash flow is sufficient to avoid 
defaulting  on any required  payments. Inflation,  however, creates cash- 
flow  pressure  on the firm,  since current  coupon  payments  must  be larger 
to compensate  for the depreciation  in the real value of the outstanding 
principal.  With  a higher  inflation  rate, the firm  is therefore  less likely to 
survive  without  outside finance  based on its cash flow alone. While  the 476  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1982 
higher  probability  of bankruptcy  by itself raises c, the faster speed with 
which  bankruptcy  occurs  lessens the  opportunity  to invest  in  inefficiently 
risky projects in an attempt to save the firm (as described in Myers), 
thereby lessening agency costs. Thus it is unclear whether inflation 
raises or lowers c. 
One final question that might  be raised about the function c is how 
different  types of debt affect it. Debt instruments  have different  maturi- 
ties, and market  and book values differ.  The size of c depends  primarily 
on the probability  of going bankrupt  at each given date in the future- 
agency costs as well as costs during bankruptcy  are linked to these 
probabilities.  What, then, determines  the probability  of bankruptcy  in 
the coming period?  Under what conditions would no one be willing  to 
extend further  credit  at the end of the period?  There  does not seem to be 
a straightforward  answer. 
If all the firm's creditors expect it to survive, the firm  could obtain 
ample  credit  and  would in fact survive. The expectation  is self-fulfilling. 
Similarly,  if all creditors  expect the firm  to fail, it would seem that the 
firm  could obtain  no outside funds and would in fact fail (unless its cash 
flow could keep it going). If it did fail, however, a new creditor  might 
still be fully compensated.  If the firm  liquidated,  then  full compensation 
would occur if the book value of the existing claims were less than the 
sale value of the assets. If the firm  reorganized,  then the outcome  is less 
clear. In general, in reorganization  the firm  can continue  a current  debt 
contract or replace it with a new contract of equal book value, as it 
chooses, so that  full payment  to the new creditor  can occur if the sum  of 
the minimum  of the book or the market  value of each liability  is less than 
the operating  value of the assets. I assume here that no new credit will 
be available  if a sudden  shift in expectations  could lead to an immediate 
loss to the new lender. 
Even if the firm  can obtain  no new credit, it may be able to continue 
if its cash flow is sufficient.  This is less likely when more of its debt is 
short  term. In addition,  to the degree  that  the market  value of long-term 
debt exceeds the book value, the firm  has an incentive  to reorganize,  so 
it may declare  bankruptcy. 
While  the one-period  probability  of bankruptcy  depends  primarily  on 
the book value of the outstanding  debt, the longer-term  probability 
depends  primarily  on the market  value of the debt. Whether  the firm  can 
eventually  repay its obligations  depends on their  present  value relative 
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Finally, new long-term debt differs from shorter-term  debt in the 
variability  of its market value. This extra variability  may increase or 
decrease the eventual probability of bankruptcy, depending on the 
correlation  of movements  in the market  value of long-term  debt  with  the 
market  value of the firm.27 
In conclusion, c  depends in a complicated way on many of the 
characteristics  of the outstanding  liabilities  relative to the value of the 
firm's  assets. 
Unexpected Changes in Interest Rates 
Because corporations  cannot  instantaneously  readjust  their  financial 
policy  in response  to new developments,  observed  debt-value  ratios  will 
reflect  in part the effects of unexpected changes. Unexpected changes 
can affect both the market  value of the firm  and the market  value of the 
firm's  liabilities.  For example, any unexpected  increase  in interest  rates 
lowers the market value of long-term  debt, but should not affect the 
value  of short-term  debt, and  does not affect  the book value  of long-term 
debt.28  Unexpected changes in the inflation  rate, holding  nominal  rates 
constant, should not affect the value of debt, except perhaps  through 
changes  in bankruptcy  risk. 
Unexpected changes in interest rates and in inflation  will affect the 
total  value of the firm  in a variety  of ways. Increases  in the real  after-tax 
discount rate reduce the value of the firm, implying  that a rise in the 
nominal  rate, given inflation,  raises debt-value  ratios, and a rise in the 
inflation  rate, given nominal  interest  rates, causes them  to fall.29  If a rise 
in  the  discount  rate  creates  fear  of a recession, or  raises  the  risk  premium, 
then  the drop  in firm  value  is accentuated.  Changes  in inflation  also affect 
27. If movements  in the nominal  interest  rate  are  primarily  changes  in the  real  discount 
rate  as well, shocks  to the market  value  of long-term  debt  will  be positively  correlated  with 
shocks  to the value of the firm,  making  long-term  debt less risky  than  short-term  debt. In 
contrast,  if the discount  rate  does not move in parallel,  long-term  debt  may  be riskier  than 
short-term  debt. 
28. The degree  to which the market  value of long-term  debt responds  to unexpected 
changes  in nominal  interest  rates depends  in part  on the nature  of any call provisions  on 
the  long-term  debt  and  on how close the current  price  is to the call price. 
29. If the hypothesis  of Modigliani  and Cohn  is correct,  changes  in the discount  rate 
arise solely from changes in nominal  interest rates because investors are assumed to 
mistakenly  use nominal  rather  than  real  discount  rates.  Unexpected  changes  in  the  inflation 
rate,  given  nominal  interest  rates, should  then  have little  effect on debt-value  ratios. 478  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1982 
expected tax payments, due to historical  cost depreciation  and FIFO 
inventory  accounting,  while changes  in the interest  rate  affect the value 
of future nominal interest deductions. Each of these effects is in the 
opposite  direction  from  the discount  rate  effect. In addition,  unexpected 
changes in both interest rates and inflation may be correlated with 
unexpected  changes  in profitability. 
Costly Adjustment of Financial Policy 
Up to this  point, it has been assumed  that  a firm  can  costlessly readjust 
its financial  policy at any date even if, as in the previous section, in 
practice  there are lags in such adjustments.  This assumption  can easily 
be questioned.  In particular,  there seem to be plausible  reasons  why the 
firm  will find it costly to change the amount  of its equity outstanding. 
Firms  seem reluctant  to change  their  dividend  payment,  making  additions 
to retained  earnings  difficult.30  New equity issues require  approval  by 
the Securities  and  Exchange  Commission,  creating  expense and  delays, 
and marketing  costs for new issues are not insubstantial.  Conversely, 
repurchase  of equity  is also viewed as being  costly-some  theorists  even 
assume  that it cannot  be done at all.31 
While  the nature  and magnitude  of these costs are unclear,  I explore 
here the implications of the assumption that changes in equity are 
increasingly  costly to the extent that they involve changes in dividend 
payments or repurchases  or new issues of equity. Because borrowing 
(or retiring  debt) is an alternative  to changes in equity, these costs of 
changing  equity provide an incentive to smooth any desired  changes  in 
equity and to vary debt rather  than equity in response to short-term 
changes in the firm's cash flow. Over time, the debt-value ratio will 
gradually  be brought  back into line. 
To make the argument  explicit, letft denote the net cash flow in the 
firm  in period t-after-tax  profits  net of interest  payments  and desired 
dividends  plus capital  consumption  allowances.  Funds  available  for new 
30. A signaling  role  for  dividends  may  explain  this  stability  in the  dividend  payout  rate. 
See Sudipto  Bhattacharya,  "Imperfect  Information,  Dividend  Policy,  and  'The  Bird  in the 
Hand'  Fallacy,"  Bell Journal  of Economics,  vol. 10  (Spring  1979),  pp. 259-70. 
31. See, for example, Alan J. Auerbach, "Wealth Maximization  and the Cost of 
Capital," Quarterly Journal of Economics,  vol. 93 (August 1979), pp. 433-46. Roger H. Gordon  479 
investment,  It, then equalft plus additions  to debt, Dt -  Dt_  1,  plus new 
equity, AEt,  obtained  either through  cuts in the dividend  or new issues. 
The gain in the value of the firm  resulting  from the new investment  is 
denoted  by v(I,).  New equity issues generate  costs, however, which are 
denoted by n(AE,).  The function n(AE,)  is assumed to be positive and 
convex,  with a minimum at AEt = 0. 
Since It depends on the size of additions  to debt, and thus implicitly 
on the size of Dt_  1, debt policy is linked across time. The value of the 
firm  this period depends in part on the amount  of debt Dt_  l inherited 
from  the past. Similarly,  how much  debt  is chosen this period  affects  the 
future  value of the firm-the more  debt  that  is acquired  now, the smaller 
is the borrowing  ability  of the firm  in the future,  implying  either  less new 
investment  or  more  equity  finance.  The  explicit  derivation  of this  relation 
between Dt and future value is complicated. The loss in value from 
starting  the next period  with debt  Dt is simply  denoted  by w(D,). 
Debt policy now affects the firm's  value through  these extra terms, 
v(I)  -  w(D,)  -  n(AE,),  as  well  as  through  the  routes  previously 
described.  If equation  3 is used to solve for the value of the firm  (D + E), 
and if, for simplicity,  8  =  (8DD +  8EE)/V  and e  =  tg, then, taking into 
account  these extra  effects, one obtains 
(6)  + E  (1- e)[G.,+ (1-  T)X]  +  [T + e(Il- T)-  M]rD -(l-  tg)cD  (6)  D+E=  (1-m)i+8 
+  v(I,) -  w(D,)  -  n(AE,). 
Maximizing  the right-hand  side of 6 with respect to Dt, and setting 
aE=  -1  implies 
(4e)  [T+e(1-T)-m]  r+D  aD/ 
+  (n' - w')[(l  -  m)i + 8] =  (I -  tg)  (aD) 
The extra factor, (n' - w'), measures  the value of expanding  invest- 
ment through extra debt now, compared with leaving the borrowing 
ability  available  for future  use. The addition  of this new term will tend 
to smooth  the time pattern  of debt. Due to the'assumed  convexity of the 
costs of changing equity, the firm will want to spread over time any 
desired  readjustment  of its debt-value  ratio. As a result, it will react  less 480  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1982 
to temporary movements in interest rates than to more permanent 
changes, so short-term  interest rates may matter  less than the earlier 
theory suggested. 
In addition, this extra term will tend to be positive during  periods 
when the value of new investment  is particularly  high, or in which cash 
flow is unusually bad. This effect therefore should produce a cyclical 
pattern of  debt-value ratios, with higher ratios presumably during 
recessions  when  cash  flow  is a problem  and  lower  ratios  during  recoveries 
when cash is more  plentiful. 
Empirical Investigation of Corporate Debt-Value Ratios 
The basic theoretical  model discussed, in which a tax advantage  to 
extra debt finance is just offset by bankruptcy-related  costs of further 
debt, implies a  strong positive relation between expected nominal 
interest rates and debt-value  ratios. This theory may therefore  help to 
explain  both the current  high  bankruptcy  rate  during  a recession  follow- 
ing a period of record-high  nominal  interest rates and the association 
between nominal  interest rates and debt-value  ratios during  the 1960s 
and 1970s. 
Testing the various  theories empirically  is not straightforward,  how- 
ever, since little  is known  about  key elements  in  the theory.  In  particular, 
the bankruptcy  cost function, c, could easily have shifted  over time due 
to institutional changes. The sophistication of bond covenants has 
changed  over time; the bankruptcy  law was amended  once in 1979;  and 
case law dealing  with bankruptcy  has changed  continuously.  All these 
factors  are  difficult  to control  for  empirically.  In  addition,  theory  provides 
little guidance  concerning  the specific  functional  form  of c. 
In principle,  if v or m could be measured  directly, one could control 
for the effects described  by DeAngelo-Masulis  and Miller.  32 However, 
data available on the Compustat  tape are not sufficient  to calculate  ;, 
even ex post. Although  m has been estimated  indirectly  in various  ways, 
there  is still substantial  disagreement  over its general  size, let alone how 
its value has changed  over time.33 
32. See DeAngelo  and Masulis,  "Optimal  Capital  Structure,"  and  Miller,  "Debt and 
Taxes.  " 
33. See, for example,  Huston  McCulloch,  "The  Tax-Adjusted  Yield  Curve";  Gordon 
and Malkiel, "Corporation  Finance"; and Shiller and Modigliani,  "Coupon and Tax 
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A further  problem  with testing  these theories  empirically  is that  if one 
goes back far enough historically, debt-value  ratios are clearly incon- 
sistent with the forecasts from the theories presented  in this paper. If 
there were no corporate  taxation, for example, but some agency costs 
from debt, then debt-value  ratios ought to be very low. Yet, according 
to the figures compiled by Taggart,  debt-value ratios were quite high 
during  the first  three  decades of this century,  a period  in which  corporate 
tax rates  were very low, if not zero.34  While  there  are  various  theories  in 
the literature  that can explain use of debt finance, even without tax 
effects, these theories do not easily explain the variation  over time in 
debt-value  ratios.35 
The role of the theories presented in this paper in explaining  debt- 
value ratios should have become much more important  in recent years 
with the sharp  growth in tax rates during  World  War  II and the rise in 
interest  rates  in  the 1970s.  I therefore  conduct  a simple  test of the  theories 
with data from the recent past. Since tax rates have been very stable 
during  this period, I focus on the relation  between debt-value  ratios  and 
interest and inflation rates.36  A brief summary  of what the theories 
forecast is as follows. 
The basic tax advantage-bankruptcy  cost model  implies  that  the debt- 
value ratio should be positively related to nominal  interest rates, and 
that use of short-term  debt ought to depend positively on shorter-term 
34. See Robert  A. Taggart,  Jr., "Secular  Patterns  in Corporate  Finance," Working 
Paper  810  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research, 1981). 
35. For example,  agency  costs c need not be minimized  when  there  is no debt-public 
issues  of equity  have  agency  costs as well. Forfurtherdiscussion,  see Jensen  and  Meckling, 
"Theory  of the Firm." For two other nontax explanations  for use of debt finance,  see 
Stephen  A. Ross, "The Determination  of Financial  Structure:  The Incentive-Signalling 
Approach,"  Bell Journal  of Economics, vol. 8 (Spring  1977),  pp. 23-40; and Stewart  C. 
Myers  and Nicholas S. Majluf,  "Stock Issues and Investment  Policy When  Firms  Have 
Information  that Investors Do Not Have," Working  Paper 884 (National Bureau of 
Economic  Research,  1982). 
36. In  this  paper  I compare  the  observed  levels of the  debt-value  ratio  with  the  expected 
values  and  unexpected  changes  in  interest  rates  and  inflation  rates.  An  alternative  approach 
for examining  corporate  financial  policy would  be to compare  explicit  debt-management 
activities  (new issues and  repurchases  of debt  or equity)  with  recent  unexpected  changes 
in interest  rates or inflation.  Although  this approach  would provide  more detail on the 
process of debt management,  it does not by itself provide  a test of the various  theories. 
Unexpected  increases  in interest  rates, for example,  lead  to increases  in both  the desired 
and the actual debt-value ratio before the firm responds. The action the firm takes 
(decreasing  or increasing  debt relative  to equity)  depends  on whether  the desired  or the 
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rates  primarily.37  The effect of inflation,  given nominal  interest  rates, is 
not clear. 
The DeAngelo-Masulis  model by itself implies that the debt-value 
ratio will depend negatively on nominal rates, given inflation, and 
positively on inflation,  given nominal  rates. 
The Miller  model by itself suggests, though  not unambiguously,  that 
the debt-value ratio will depend negatively on both nominal interest 
rates  and inflation. 
Unexpected increases in the real discount  rate  will lower firm  value, 
and unexpected increases in nominal  rates will lower the market  value 
of longer-term  debt. This implies that an unexpected rise in nominal 
interest rates, given inflation,  raises at least book value of debt-to-firm 
value ratios, while unexpected inflation,  given nominal rates, lowers 
debt-value  ratios. 
The Modigliani-Cohn  hypothesis implies that measured  debt-value 
ratios ought to depend positively on expected inflation.38  Unexpected 
inflation,  given nominal  rates, ought  to have little effect, however, since 
investors are presumed  to discount  using nominal  rates rather  than  real 
rates. 
The adjustment costs  story suggests higher debt-value ratios in 
recessions and lower debt-value  ratios in recoveries as well as slower 
responses to changes  in incentives. 
These theories are not mutually exclusive, so that all the effects 
described  can occur simultaneously.  Data necessary to distinguish  the 
role  of each theory  empirically  are  not available.  Instead,  the net relation 
between  debt-value  ratios  and  past  interest  and  inflation  rates  is measured 
in an effort to indicate which aspects of the overall theory seem to be 
most important. 
The debt-value  ratios  were constructed  from  the data  on the 1980  and 
the 1969  Compustat  tapes. These data  sets provided  annual  information 
37. Because, according  to the arguments  above, it may be preferable  to refinance  the 
short-term  debt rather  than change  the firm's  equity, the desirability  of short-term  debt 
will depend  as well on expected  future  interest  rates. 
38. As discussed in note 20, the coefficient  on inflation  in the regression  for market 
debt-value  ought  to be on the order  of (DIV) (1 -  e)/[(l  -  m)i  +  jE].  In the estimation, 
inflation  is entered  linearly,  even though  by this argument  it ought  to interact  with  other 
variables.  Since  all  aspects  of the  relation  between  debt-value  ratios  and  interest  or  inflation 
rates  are  in principle  nonlinear,  it did  not  seem  worthwhile  to constructjust  the  nonlinearity 
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on the market  value of equity, the book value of debt, and interest  paid 
on preferred  stock during  1949-80  for a large sample  of publicly  traded 
corporations.  The market  value of the long-term  debt and  the preferred 
stock during 1956-78 were then estimated  using data on the industry- 
wide ratios of market  to book value of debt and ratios of dividends  to 
prices for preferred  stock reported  in von Furstenberg,  Malkiel, and 
Watson.39  To estimate  market  values during  1979-80,  similar  rates  were 
calculated  using the data in Moody's Bond Digest.  From these data an 
annual  time series was constructed  for 1956-80  on the ratios  of aggregate 
market  value of debt to aggregate  firm  value, aggregate  book value of 
debt to aggregate firm value, and aggregate short-term  debt to firm 
value.40 
Nominal interest rates and inflation not only play a role in the 
equilibrium  models of debt-value  ratios, but also can cause changes in 
debt-value ratios directly, through revaluations.  Any measure of the 
relation between interest rates or inflation  and debt-value ratios will 
capture both sources of effects. Since the firm will react slowly to 
changing  incentives, however,  it seems  reasonable  to suppose  that  recent 
changes have caused immediate revaluations but have led to little 
behavioral  response, while less recent changes  have been responded  to 
more fully, and any revaluation  effects have been largely  offset in the 
interim.  The strategy,  then, is to capture  the behavioral  effect of interest 
rates and inflation  through  concentrating  on the effects of less recent 
movements in rates, while the effect of more recent movements are 
presumed  to be due mainly  to revaluations. 
39. See George  M. von Furstenberg,  Burton  G. Malkiel,  and  Harry  S. Watson,  "The 
Distribution  of Investment  Between Industries:  A Microeconomic  Application  of the 'q' 
Ratio," in George  M. von Furstenberg,  ed., Capital,  Efficiency,  and Growth  (Ballinger, 
1980), pp. 395-460. 
40. Here the market  value of the firm  equals  the market  value of the common  equity 
plus  the market  value  of the preferred  stock, plus  the market  value  of the  debt  (both  short- 
and  long-term).  To construct  these ratios, I used data  only on firms  whose reported  debt 
and  equity  figures  are  year-end  values  (between  November  and  January).  To construct  the 
time  series I used the adjusted  procedure  described  in Gordon  and  Malkiel,  "Corporation 
Finance," which attempts to lessen any bias, caused by having a less representative 
sample  of firms  in earlier  years, through  focusing  on rates  of change  in debt  and  total  value 
between  each two consecutive years  for firms  reporting  data  in both years. During  1961- 
68, the period  for which data  were available,  I averaged  the calculated  ratios. For short- 
term  debt, data  on debt  in current  liabilities  were  used, which  include  not only short-term 
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To justify this strategy, assume that the firm's slow adjustment  to 
changes  can be approximated  by a partial  adjustment  model, whereby 
(7)  (  V)+  ( -V(  ),_,  ()  +  St. 
Here, (D/V)t is the actual  debt-value  ratio  in the tth period;  (D/V)* is the 
optimal  debt-value  ratio, ignoring  adjustment  costs; and St is the unex- 
pected change in (D/V)t. To state the argument  simply, assume that the 
desired  debt-value  ratio  depends  on a single  nominal  interest  rate,  r, and 
the shock term, St, depends on the unexpected change in this rate, Et. 
Stated  explicitly, assume that 
(8a)  (D/V)t*  =  oxrt 
(8b)  St =  PE. 
Again for simplicity, assume that the interest rate, rt, approximately 
follows a random  walk, so that rt =  E  -j.  Given these assumptions, 
j=0 
(DlV)t  can be expressed as 
(9)  (DlV)t  =  E  [Xk3  +  (1-Ak)l]. 
k=O 
The coefficient on E-k  is a weighted  average  of the equilibrium  effect (x 
and the revaluation  effect 3, with the weight on a. approaching  one for 
earlier  values of E,-k  and the weight  on I approaching  1 for more  recent 
values of Et-k 
Another  problem  that  must  be faced is that  the two interest  rate  series 
on corporate  bonds  are  to a degree  endogenous-higher debt-value  ratios 
imply higher risk, and thus higher coupons on any debt issues. The 
procedure  chosen for handling  these two problems  together  is as follows. 
I constructed  the average values of the long-term  new issue AA utility 
bond interest rate, the six-month  finance paper rate, and the inflation 
rate, for the calendar  year preceding  the debt-value  ratio  observation.41 
41. The  interest  rate  data  are  from  the Salomon  Brothers  Center,  An  AnalyticalRecord 
of Yields  and Yield  Spreads. The inflation  rate is measured  using  the CPI  through  1958, 
and the fixed weight price index for personal  consumption  expenditures  other than  food 
and  energy  was taken  from the U.S. Bureau  of Economic  Analysis,  national  income  and 
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Each of the two interest rate variables were then divided into three 
orthogonal  components:42  the forecasted  value using  a set of exogenous 
instruments from the previous December, the improvement in the 
forecast using exogenous instruments  from the current  year, and the 
remaining  residual,  which  may  be endogenous.  The  first  component  was 
then used to capture  the equilibrium  effect, and the second to capture 
any revaluation  effect. In contrast,  I assumed  that  the inflation  rate was 
exogenous, and so broke  it down into  just two components,  the forecast 
using exogenous data from the previous December43  and the residual. 
Both were then included  in the debt-value  regressions.44 
The final  problem  is how best to control  for cyclical effects. While  it 
would be possible to construct an approximate  measure of cash-flow 
pressure for these firms, such a measure would certainly be endoge- 
nous-cash  flow, new investment,  and  the current  debt-value  ratios  are 
all closely linked  according  to the theories.  Rather  than  constructing  this 
measure and using instruments,  I included  instead a standard  cyclical 
variable, the layoff rate. Its average value during  the current  year was 
included  in the regressions. 
I then estimated three regressions using annual data from 1956 to 
42. For long-term  corporate  rates, the first  component  was constructed  by using as 
instruments  the six-month  Treasury  bill  rate  and  the long-term  government  bond  rate  both 
from  the previous  December;  the second component  was constructed  using  the average 
long-term  government  bond  rate  from  the current  year.  Similarly,  for  short-term  corporate 
rates, the first  component  was constructed  using  the six-month  Treasury  bill  rate  and  the 
two-year  government  note rate  from  the previous  December,  and  the second  component, 
using  the average  six-month  Treasury  bill  rate  during  the current  year.  Government  rates 
are free from any endogeneity due to default risk. Since corporate  and government 
securities markets  are closely linked, it is possible that a shift in the composition  of 
corporate  securities may affect the price of government  securities, but this link was 
believed  to be sufficiently  weak to be ignored. 
43. The average  inflation  rate during  the current  year was forecast  using  the average 
inflation  rate in the previous year, the six-month  Treasury  bill rate, and the two-year 
government  note rate  from  the previous  December. 
44. Only inflation  forecasts over a short time-horizon  are captured  here. The short- 
term  inflation  rate  plays a key role in measuring  effects of inflation  on tax rates. Also, the 
size of the bias under  the Modigliani  and Cohn hypothesis  was derived  in terms  of.the 
short-term  rate. Revaluation  effects, however, depend  on longer-term  inflationary  fore- 
casts. Such  forecasts  are  difficult  to construct,  and  were  not  attempted  here.  To the  degree 
that unexpected changes in nominal interest rates are more closely associated with 
unexpected  changes  in long-term  inflation  forecasts  than  are  unexpected  changes  in short- 
term  inflation  rates, the coefficient  on the unexpected  nominal  interest  rate may capture 
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Table 1. Debt-Value  Regressions, 1956-80a 
Dependent  variable 
Ratio  of  Ratio  of  Ratio  of 
Independent  variable and  market debt to  book debt to  short-term debt 
summary statistic  market value  market value  to market value 
Intercept  -0.051  -0.146  -0.049 
(0.046)  (0.058)  (0.015) 
Interest rate 
Expected  long-term rate  0.065  0.084  0.015 
(0.013)  (0.016)  (0.004) 
Unexpected  long-term rate  0.057  0.050  0.003 
(0.031)  (0.039)  (0.010) 
Expected  short-term rate  -0.026  -0.024  0.001 
(0.008)  (0.010)  (0.003) 
Unexpected  short-term rate  -  0.014  -0.012  0.001 
(0.010)  (0.013)  (0.003) 
Expected  inflation  -  0.016  -  0.025  -0.008 
(0.009)  (0.011)  (0.003) 
Unexpected  inflation  0.013  0.015  0.003 
(0.005)  (0.006)  (0.002) 
Layoff rate  0.027  0.042  0.004 
(0.014)  (0.017)  (0.005) 
Summary statistic 
R  2  0.896  0.916  0.894 
Standard error  0.025  0.031  0.008 
Source:  Regressions  as described  in the text,  using the Compustat data tape. 
a.  The figures in parentheses  are the standard errors. 
1980, with the dependent  variables  being the ratios of market  value of 
debt to market  value of the firms,  book value of debt to market  value of 
the firms, and short-term  debt to market value of the firms. In each 
equation,  the independent  variables  used were the expected long-term 
interest  rate, the unexpected  change  in the long-term  rate, the expected 
short-term  interest rate, the unexpected change in the short-term  rate, 
the expected inflation  rate, the unexpected  change in the inflation  rate, 
and  the layoff rate. The results  are reported  in table 1. 
Regression  results  from  twenty-five  observations  and  eight  estimated 
coefficients must be viewed with some caution. Standard  errors in 
particular  could be biased due to autocorrelation  or heteroscedasticity. 
However, certain results do stand out. In all three regressions the 
expected long-term  interest rate plays a dominant  role. Its coefficients 
are  significant  statistically,  and  the implied  economic  effect is extremely Roger  H.  Gordon  487 
large.  For example,  each point  rise in the nominal  interest  rate  raises  the 
market value of the debt-value ratio by 0.065. This is a very large 
movement, given the historic range in the ratio. This coefficient is 
consistent with the implications  of the tax advantage-bankruptcy  cost 
model and inconsistent with the DeAngelo-Masulis  or Miller models. 
The  latter  effects, while  undoubtedly  present,  do not  appear  to be playing 
an important  role here. 
The coefficients on the unexpected long-term  interest rate are also 
large  and positive, a result consistent with the revaluation  story. Their 
size is close to that of the coefficients of the expected long-term  rate, 
which suggests either that the revaluation  effect and the behavioral 
effect are similar  in size or that the adjustment  process suggested  here 
fails to capture  the difference  between the two effects. 
The coefficients on the two short-term  interest rate variables are 
harder  to explain. While  adjustment  costs imply  that  the expected short- 
term rate should play a lesser role, its predicted effect from the tax 
advantage-bankruptcy  cost model  is still  positive,  particularly  in  explain- 
ing the use of short-term  debt.45  In contrast, its coefficient  in the short- 
term  debt equation  is basically  zero, while in the other  two equations  it 
is significantly  negative, though  much  smaller  in absolute  value than  the 
coefficient  on expected long-term  rates. The negative  coefficient  on the 
unexpected  component  is inconsistent  with  the revaluation  effect, though 
again  the  coefficient  is small  relative  to thaton  the  unexpected  component 
of long-term  rates. Perhaps  this variable  is capturing  cyclical effects. 
The coefficient on expected inflation  is also negative  and significant, 
though  not very large. Its value is significantly  different,  however, from 
the large positive value forecast by the Modigliani-Cohn  hypothesis. 
One possible explanation  of the negative value is an associated rise in 
personal  marginal  tax rates, weakening  the tax advantage  to debt. 
The positive coefficient on unexpected inflation  is inconsistent  with 
the revaluation  effect. Unexpected  inflation  may  also in  part  be a cyclical 
proxy-unexpected  inflation  may signal  a future  tightening  in monetary 
policy and an associated drop  in the value of the firm. 
Finally,  the explicit  cyclical variable,  the layoff  rate, is significant  and 
indicates  higher  debt-value  ratios  during  recessions, as expected. Since 
unexpected short-term rates and unexpected inflation may also be 
45. While the DeAngelo and Masulis  and the Miller  models imply negative  effects, 
they  do not help  rationalize  a negative  effect ofjust short-term  rates. 488  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1982 
playing  a cyclical role, the size and  exact timing  of the cyclical effect are 
hard  to evaluate. 
Conclusion 
In this paper  I have examined  both theoretically  and empirically  the 
links  between interest  rates, inflation,  and  debt-value  ratios.  In the basic 
theory explored there is a presumed  tax advantage  to debt finance  due 
to the deductibility  of nominal  interest  payments  at the corporate  level. 
In equilibrium  this tax savings is offset by bankruptcy  and  agency costs 
arising  from extra debt. Since the value of the tax savings per dollar  of 
debt is larger  when nominal  interest rates increase, the firm's  optimal 
debt-value  ratio  should  also increase.  In the empirical  work  it was found 
that  debt-value  ratios  and  nominal  interest  rates  have in  fact been closely 
linked. 
The findings  indicate  that as nominal  interest  rates rise, bankruptcy 
and  agency costs of debt  will rise also. In fact, following  the tremendous 
rise in nominal  rates in 1980,  the United States is now experiencing  the 
highest business failure  rate since the 1930s.  This association between 
bankruptcy  costs and nominal  interest  rates that are raised  by inflation 
provides  another  justification  for the argument  that inflation  is costly. Comments 
and Discussion 
John B. Shoven: The determination  of corporate  financial  policy has 
always  been hard  to model  satisfactorily.  Franco  Modigliani  and  Merton 
H. Miller originally  argued  that the debt-equity  ratio did not matter  in 
the sense that  it did not affect the total  value of the firm.  However, when 
taxes are included in the argument,  it is evident that the government's 
claim is eroded when the debt-equity ratio is increased. So without 
bankruptcy  costs, as in the Modigliani-Miller  model, this leads to 100 
percent  debt finance.  By the same  reasoning,  the bankruptcy  probability 
and bankruptcy  costs limit the extent to which a firm  wants to use debt 
finance.  These considerations  lead  to what  Gordon  refers  to as the model 
of tax advantage  versus bankruptcy  costs in which, at the margin,  the 
tax advantage  of debt is just offset by the expected bankruptcy  costs 
that  additional  debt incurs. 
Other  models  argue  that  there  is no tax advantage  to debt  at the  margin 
because at the optimal debt-equity  ratio the combination  of corporate 
and personal tax rates are the same for both sources of finance. This 
condition  can be maintained  as the aggregate  debt-equity  ratio  changes. 
Either  the effective corporate  tax rate can change-which  is suggested 
by the model developed by Harry  DeAngelo and Ronald  W. Masulis  - 
or  the personal  tax rate  can change  as Miller  suggested  in his presidential 
address in the Journal of Finance. 
Gordon  shows that, in the tax advantage-bankruptcy  costs model, as 
nominal  interest  rates  rise the tax advantage  to debt  climbs,  leading  firms 
to choose a higher  debt-value  ratio. 
I do not think this result, in theory, is quite as unambiguous  as the 
paper  suggests. At a fixed debt-equity  ratio, high  interest  rates not only 
give a higher  tax shelter per dollar  of debt, but they also raise the costs 
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and probability  of bankruptcy  for firms  with debt obligations.  The net 
result is probably  as Gordon  claims. But I would have liked to see this 
second effect modeled  explicitly. 
Both  the DeAngelo-Masulis  model  and  the  Miller  model  would  predict 
that at higher  interest rates firms  would want a lower debt-equity  ratio. 
This difference could be used to choose empirically  between the com- 
peting  models. 
One  problem  I have with  the model  in this paper  is that  the purchasers 
of debt and equity have the same attitude  toward  risk and the same tax 
rate. This assumption  seems less realistic  than  a sorting  model in which 
those who buy debt are  more  risk  averse and  have different  personal  tax 
rates  than those who buy equities. 
In the empirical  work the equations  that are estimated  do not really 
test the model and, in some ways, do not represent  it well. First, no tax 
rates appear in the regressions, although  taxes are central to the tax 
advantage-bankruptcy  cost model. Second, there is a lot of multicolin- 
earity among the independent  variables. There are two interest rates 
and  expected inflation  on the right-hand  side, making  it difficult  to prove 
which of the several  variables  are determining  the debt-value  ratio. 
Another problem is that interest rates may determine debt-value 
ratios,  but  debt-value  ratios  may  also affect  interest  rates. So it is unclear 
whether  one estimated  the demand  curve, the supply  curve, or neither. 
Gordon attempts to get around  that by using government  rather  than 
corporate  interest rates. But I am not sure that technique  handles the 
problem  satisfactorily. 
Perhaps the biggest problem is that the debt-value  ratio to a large 
degree is determined  by what is happening  to the value of equity in the 
denominator.  Interest  rates  and  the stock market  are  probably  cyclically 
related,  with  high  interest  rates  leading  to a weak  stock  market.  Therefore 
rising  interest  rates  would cause the debt-value  ratio  to increase  through 
this effect on equity prices. 
The model in the paper predicts that when interest rates are high, 
firms  sell bonds  and  buy back  stock so as to adjust  their  debt-equity  ratio 
through  an active restructuring  of the firm's capital. But because the 
value of equity is changing  with stock prices, we may not be observing 
this tax-arbitrage  bankruptcy-cost  optimization  at all. 
For these reasons, I was not convinced by the empirical  work that I 
should  choose Gordon's  model over alternatives  with different  implica- Roger H.  Gordon  491 
tions. There are  just too many problems  in interpreting  the regressions 
that  are shown. 
General Discussion 
Stanley Fischer suggested that Gordon  estimate his model using the 
marginal-debt  equity ratios for new issues rather  than the ratio of the 
total stock of debt and equity. In this way, the analysis would look 
directly  at the way firms  raise funds  in a given year rather  than  trying  to 
infer  that from data that show mainly  how funds have been raised  over 
the firms' past history. James Tobin observed that the average debt- 
equity ratio is not easily adjustable  within a one-year period and that 
firms  do not  make  big  switches  between  outstanding  debt  and  outstanding 
equity  by repurchasing  one or the other. For that reason, he suggested 
that Gordon's empirical estimates should explicitly allow for lagged 
adjustment. 
John  Campbell  suggested  that  some of Gordon's  reported  coefficients 
could  be interpreted  differently  from  the way they were in the paper.  He 
questioned  whether  the coefficient  on the long-term  interest  rate repre- 
sents the impact  of the perceived real long-term  rate. He reasoned  that 
the long-term  interest rate contains some component  reflecting  expec- 
tations  of future  inflation,  and  these expectations  may  be more  accurately 
reflected  in this variable  than  in the current  inflation  rate. Campbell  was 
also skeptical  of Gordon's  decomposition  of interest  and inflation  rates 
into expected and unexpected  components.  Since the expected compo- 
nent is estimated  on the basis of a regression  that contains  information 
for the entire period, there is  an implicit and probably erroneous 
assumption  that agents knew what those coefficients  were at the begin- 
ning of the period. Much of the "expected" component  might conse- 
quently  have been unexpected. 
Charles  Holt commented  on the estimate, cited by Gordon,  that the 
legal  and  administrative  costs of bankruptcy  are only about  5 percent  of 
a firm's  outstanding  liabilities. He observed that these represent  only a 
fraction  of the total costs of bankruptcy.  When the Internal  Revenue 
Service auctions off the assets of bankrupt  corporations, the assets 
usually command a price that is only 10 to 25 percent of their usual 
market  value. 